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SYMPOSIUM: DEFINING RACE 
COLORBLIND DIVERSITY: THE CHANGING SIGNIFICANCE 

OF "RACE" IN THE POST-BAKKE ERA 

Bridgette Baldwin* 
"If there is one lesson to be learned from our tragic experience in 
the Civil War and its wake, it is that the question of racial 
discrimination is never settled until it is settled right. It is not yet 
rightly settled." 
Chief Justice Earl Warren l 
"Thus, in the long effort to gain equality through integration, 
blacks have learned that white America will accommodate the 
interests of blacks and other racial minorities when and only when 
those interests converge with those of whites." 
Derrick Bell2 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1954, fifty-eight years after the Plessy v. Ferguson3 decision, 
* Bridgette Baldwin is an Associate Professor of Law at Western New England College 
School of Law. I greatly appreciate helpful insights from my colleagues, Erin Buzuvis, 
Lauren Carasik, and Jennifer Levi and Managing Editor of Western New England College 
Law Review, Katie Foster. I would like to thank Davarian Baldwin for his insightful 
comments and helpful criticism on early drafts of this paper and to Alex Chotkowski, Elaine 
Murphy and Katie Rallo for their research assistance. Lastly, I would like to express a debt of 
gratitude to Anthony Farley for inviting me to present these ideas at the "Defining Race" 
Symposium hosted by Albany Law School and also Dan Bresler, the Albany Law Review and 
the Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology. 
1 ABRAHAM L. DAVIS & BARBARA LUCK GRAHAM, THE SUPREME COURT, RACE, AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS xiii (1995) (quoting Chief Justice Earl Warren, Civil Rights Lecture at University of 
Notre Dame (June 2, 1957». 
2 DERRICK BELL, Victims as Heroes: A Minority Perspective on Constitutional Law, THE 
DERRICK BELL READER 290, 294 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic eds., 2005); see also DAVIS 
& GRAHAM, supra note 1, at ll5. 
3 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896) (allowing separate facilities for white and black races under 
"separate but equal treatment" doctrine). 
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the Supreme Court was afforded another opportunity to revisit the 
"separate but equal doctrine" in Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka (Brown 1).4 Brown I was a consolidation of five civil rights 
cases from the District of Columbia, Delaware, Kansas, Virginia, 
and South Carolina that attempted to change race relations in 
America by affording Mrican Americans a piece of the pie.5 A few 
other cases soon followed Brown 1. In 1963, Goss v. Board of 
Education of Knoxville6 proclaimed that any program that 
structurally appeared to maintain segregation would be held 
unconstitutional.7 And in 1964, Griffin v. Prince Edward County 
School Boards announced that pretense integration of black children 
would also violate the Constitution.9 Despite the Court's signature 
announcement of equality of "Negroes,"10 Brown I has not 
completely altered the inequalities of the past. For that reason, 
race-conscious policies instituted not only by admissions 
departments in colleges and universities but also in primary and 
secondary educational institutions are needed to level the playing 
field. Since Brown I, there have been a number of statutes, court 
cases and policies that have continued to struggle over the use of 
race-conscious policies in the goal for racial equality.l1 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964,12 the governing standard 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (Bakke),13 
California's and the state of Washington's anti-affirmative action 
propositions,14 and a number of judicial decisions regarding racial 
4 347 u.s. 483, 494-95 (1954) (overruling Plessy and forcing the integration of public 
schools). 
5 Id. at 486 & n.!. 
6 373 U.S. 683 (1963). 
7 Id. at 689. 
8 377 U.S. 218, 225 (1964) (holding that closing public schools to avoid integration of black 
children violates the equal protection clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment). 
9 Id. 
10 See, e.g., 347 U.S. at 486, 487. 
11 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.s. 244, 
270 (2003); Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978). 
12 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act states: "No person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal 
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000). Executive order 11,246 used the term 
"affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed ... without regard to their race, 
creed, color or national origin." Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 340 (1964-1965), reprinted 
in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). 
13 438 U.S. at 287. 
14 Proposition 209 was passed by the California electorate by a 54-46 percent vote on 
November 5, 1996. It is now Article I, Section 31 of the California Constitution. CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 31; S. 1687 2007-08 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007). The key operative provision of this 
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preferences are persistent themes in the continuing saga over the 
use of affirmative action and race-conscious programs.15 Race­
conscious programs were enacted for the most part to remedy past 
transgressions inflicted upon Mrican American citizens and to help 
them overcome decades of discrimination.16 The setting for the 
challenge to the few legal benefits afforded Mrican Americans in 
higher education came in the Bakke case.17 Unsurprisingly, in a 
narrowly split decision, Justice Powell announced that while 
separate benefits designed to attract and matriculate minorities 
were prohibited, affirmative action plans involving racial 
measure states: "The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education or public contracting." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 
31(a). For a discussion regarding Proposition 209, see generally LYDIA CHAVEZ, THE COLOR 
BLIND: CALIFORNIA'S BATTLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 211-41 (1998). Proposition 200 
was passed by the state of Washington by 59-41 percent vote on November 3, 1998. WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.400 (West 2008). It is now Title 49, Chapter 49.60, Section 49.60.400 
of the Revised Code of Washington. [d. The key operative provision mirrors the language of 
proposition 200: "The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." [d. 
15 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (requiring 
affirmative action programs that give preference based on race to be temporary and designed 
to eliminate "manifest racial imbalance" and to not "unnecessarily trammel the interest of the 
white employees"); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 153, 185 (1987) (upholding "one­
black-for-one-white promotion requirement" to remedy past discrimination in entry level 
hiring); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204, 236-37 (1995) (subjecting 
affirmative action programs that give preference to race by government contractors to strict 
scrutiny and must show a compelling interest for those preferences); Texas v. Lesage, 528 
U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (requiring white applicant alleging reverse discrimination only to prove 
inability to compete on equal footing); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 
F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2000) (striking down race-conscious programs because the 
programs at the University of Georgia were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest), aff'd, 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001); Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 
551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (rejecting Bakke as the governing 
standard because it did not represent the majority opinion of the court), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 
1033 (1996), remanded to 999 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 236 
F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929 (2001); Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 
2 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (W.D. Wash. 1998), aff'd, 233 F.3d 1188, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding race-conscious admission programs under the governing standard of Bakke), cert. 
denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001); Farmer v. Ramsay, 159 F. Supp. 2d 873, 887 (D. Md. 2001), aff'd 
No. 01-2039, Slip Op. at 5-6, 2002 WL 1766615 at *5-6 (4th Cir. Aug. 1, 2002) (holding that 
suit challenging diversity admission policy would be dismissed for lack of standing if the 
university can show that the applicant would not have been admitted even if race had played 
no role in the decision to reject or admit the applicant); Weser v. Glen, 190 F. Supp. 2d 384, 
406 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding school's diversity policy to be facially neutral and non­
discriminatory because race and gender were not used as factors in the admissions policy). 
16 See BERNARD R. BOXILL, BLACKS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 147-48 (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers 1992) (1984). 
17 See Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269-70, 272 (1978). 
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classification were permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment,18 
Ironically, however, what appears to be a permissive judicial 
decision actually signaled the downward spiral against legal 
considerations of racial diversity within higher education. 
In what follows, I will first argue that while Bakke preserved the 
possibility of race preference, its language of racial neutrality 
detached the law from the social and historical context of racial 
inequalities. The language on race is so neutral that it has allowed 
whites to argue that racial preferences constitute reverse 
discrimination under the law,19 This same language that was once 
used to right past wrongs is now being used to support "white skin 
privilege."2o Second, denying the social and historical context of 
governing standards like Bakke allows society to ignore that white 
preferences still exist. Because Bakke never erased white 
preferences, diversity must remain a key factor in our 
implementation of affirmative action programs. Finally, while 
Grutter u. Bollinger21 reinforced the value of diversity in higher 
education settings, I contend that diversity is a variable that should 
be incorporated into affirmative action programs that extend to all 
levels of education. 
1. HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CLIMATE 
It is important to view court decisions involving affirmative action 
programs in the context of the social and historical climate in which 
they were delivered. Unbeknownst to many, the Bakke case was not 
the first decision on race-based admissions policies in higher 
learning institutions to reach the Supreme Court. The first case 
was Defunis u. Odegaard.22 Luckily, the issue surrounding whether 
Marco Defunis, Jr. was the victim of reverse discrimination in this 
case was rendered moot,23 leaving intact the spirit of Brown I that 
recognizes group inequalities in their historical context.24 This 
18 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 (2003) (discussing Justice Powell's opinion in 
Bakke). 
19 Crutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-14). 
20 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127B S. Ct. 2738, 2748 
(2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003); Crutter, 539 U.S. at 316-17. 
21 Crutter, 539 U.S. at 343. 
22 Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974) (holding that the issue of reverse 
discrimination was moot considering that Defunis would graduate with his class no matter 
what decision the Court reached). 
23 Id. 

24 What is meant by "spirit of Brown l' is that Brown I recognized group inequalities 
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proved to be a short lived victory, however, because just four years 
later, Allen Bakke sued the Regents of California Medical School, 
alleging that he was denied admission twice for what he deemed to 
be discriminatory reasons.25 With no majority opinion, the Supreme 
Court reached its landmark 5-4 decision with "no single one 
speaking for the Court."26 While the Bakke decision ruled that 
universities could not set specific quotas for minority admissions, it 
left open the possibility that race could be used as a factor to 
achieve the important goal of diversity on campuses.27 Under the 
Court's strict scrutiny analysis, the governing standard was clear, 
race-based admissions policies could still be used to matriculate 
minority students.28 
The Supreme Court's preservation of racial preferences in Bakke 
indicates that the Court believed that we had not arrived at our 
colorblind country. The Court's seemingly neutral ruling, however, 
in fact detached the law from the true social and historical context 
of then-existing racial inequalities. By example, the Court 
concluded that "[a]s the interest of diversity is compelling in the 
context of a university's admissions program ...."29 "Ethnic 
diversity, however, is only one element in a range of factors a 
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a 
heterogeneous student body."30 By indicating that ethnic diversity 
may be used as a factor instead of perhaps connecting racial 
representation to historic oppression, the Court opened the door for 
anyone to claim racial oppression based on simply having an ethnic 
identity. This seemingly ambiguous language allowed whites to 
suggest that their race too must be considered as a factor in a race­
based policy. It also gives those identified as white the opportunity 
to argue for "white skin privilege" under the guise that their civil 
rights are being violated and that they become the victims of 
reverse discrimination when policies are created to target truly 
marginalized minority groups. 
within a historical context. By contrast, Bakke utilizes the language of group rights, but does 
not recognize their historical context. 
25 Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276-78 (1978). 
26 [d. at 325 (concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with Justice Powell 
were Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun). 
27 [d. at 318. 
28 [d. ("No such facial infirmity exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic 
background is simply one element-to be weighed fairly against other elements-in the 
selection process."). 
29 [d. at 314. 
30 [d. 
868 Albany Law Review [Vol. 72 
Likewise, it is clear that 
[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing 
when applied to one individual and something else ... to a 
person of another color. If both are not accorded the same 
protection, then it is not equaL... [T]he [Fourteenth] 
Amendment itself was framed in universal terms, without 
reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior 
servitude.31 
While this may be true, in this country, white people have never 
been relegated to substandard housing, or subjected to poor health 
care or limited educational opportunities on the grounds of race. 
While inequality to white people might come from class, gender or 
sexual orientation, when one is culturallyllegally sanctioned as 
white in this country, one acquires some variable level of "white 
skin privilege," whether the beneficiaries of this privilege realize it 
or not. The converse is true for Mrican Americans, who confront 
the ubiquitous consequence of being born into the ''black detriment." 
It is obvious that the plurality opinion in Bakke at least realized 
that the consideration of race was also meant to afford minorities at 
least a seat on the train and not necessarily a free ride to the top.32 
The Court's language, however, safeguards positions of power for 
whites. Here again, 
this Court has ... interpret[ed] the Equal Protection 
Clause ... assuring to all persons "the protection of equal 
laws," in a Nation confronting a legacy of slavery and racial 
discrimination. . . . [L]andmark decisions ... arose in 
response to the continued exclusion of Negroes from the 
mainstream of American society, [and the decisions] could be 
characterized as involving discrimination by the "majority" 
white race against the Negro minority. But they need not be 
read as depending upon that characterization for their 
results. It suffices to say that ... "this Court has 
consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people 
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality."'33 
31 [d. at 289-90, 293. 
32 See generally id. at 387-90, 396--402 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting in part) 
(discussing the history of discrimination and the hypocrisy in the notion that the same 
constitution that allowed Mrican American subversion cannot now be used to cure its ills). 
33 [d. at 293-94 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967» (citations omitted). 
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On the surface level, one could applaud this passage as 
recognition by the Court of past discrimination on the grounds of 
racial injustice. Under closer analysis, however, a language of 
neutrality immediately suppresses the original declaration where 
the Court says that the equal protection decisions "need not be read 
as depending upon that characterization [(discrimination of blacks 
by whites)] for their results."34 In my mind, this passage becomes 
the linchpin in turning a conversation about injustice against 
African Americans, contemplated within its historical and social 
context, into an abstract conversation about race that could be 
accessed by anyone despite his or her privileges.35 So, what was 
once an issue of racial inequality is transformed into one merely of 
racial difference. After Bakke, it was not inequality on the grounds 
of racial injustice that conferred rights, but just the simple 
ownership of a racial identity, whether black or white, which 
conferred a position of poverty or privilege. It is this passage that 
reinforced the legal justification for terms like reverse 
discrimination. 
Although the question in Bakke boiled down to whether race could 
be a permissible consideration in admissions policies, the illusion of 
Bakke was that race-conscious affirmative action policies in higher 
learning institutions provided a practical solution to the exclusion of 
African Americans from proper representation in society. The 
purpose of the language of Bakke was to insure that minorities are 
represented in meaningful numbers in our workforce. But as the 
Court points out, "[n]othing in the Constitution supports the notion 
that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible 
burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic 
groups."36 "[P]referential programs ... reinforce common 
stereotypes" and "there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent 
persons . . . to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their 
making."37 Under this rationale, we deny the historical race-based 
policies that previously worked to exclude African Americans from 
federal and state benefits. It is true that some "innocent" whites, 
who were not even born during slavery, may suffer because of 
preferential programs. Without these programs, however, the 
34 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294. 

35 See DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER 

46, 86, 149 (1994). 
36 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298. 
37 Id. 
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inequity emanating from the remnants of slavery will continue to 
permeate our social, political, and economic institutions. This, in 
turn, will continue to marginalize a disproportionate number of 
minorities. Further, without some form of affirmative action, 
equally "innocent" Mrican Americans, who are descendants of 
slaves, will also continue to "bear the burdens of 
[these] ... grievances not of their making."38 Moreover, while white 
people may suffer individually from so-called affirmative action 
programs, as a group, they benefit by not having to engage in a fully 
competitive marketplace, against both minority and women workers 
(of all races) in the absence of affirmative action. 
In addition, the perpetual language of the Court to disparage 
race-based policies as harming an "innocent group" is perplexing. 
While I recognize that some innocent white people are affected by 
affirmative action programs, "inherent unfairness"39 to innocent 
people also exists when a company moves overseas, downsizes, 
liquidates its company, or when a white woman gets an affirmative 
action spot on the grounds of gender and not race. Are these white 
males any less a victim in those circumstances?40 This language 
denies that Mrican Americans and other minority groups are 
innocent victims too. Moreover, while affirmative action policies are 
deemed unfair, they actually make the marketplace more 
competitive by including previously excluded groups, including 
white women.41 White males, historically, have not had to compete 
with these groups before. And, the realities of an existing race­
based labor market are actually challenged through affirmative 
action. 
It is also understandable that white people feel that "we have 
rights too, stop victimizing us!" But have White Americans really 
been victims of a society-endorsed mistreatment as a class of 
previously enslaved people on the grounds of their racial identity? 
Clearly not. Additionally, white people who allege reverse 
discrimination contend that these programs are unfair to them 
because they allow a less qualified Mrican American to take their 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 294 n.34. 
40 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.s. 616, 641-42 (1987) (holding that 
considering sex as one factor in promoting an employee over equally qualified male employee 
under affirmative action is constitutional). 
41 See W.H. Knight, Jr. & Adrien Wing, Weep Not, Little Ones: An Essay to Our Children 
About Affirmative Action, in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 208, 212 
(John Hope Franklin & Genna Rae McNeil eds., 1995). 
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spot.42 This argument is flawed on several grounds: first, it ignores 
the possibility that the Mrican American could in fact be more 
qualified; and second, it assumes that the white person would have 
received the spot even if the history of racism and oppression did 
not exist. A double-edged sword emerges. On one hand, to 
introduce the consideration of race and give racial preference would 
condemn the safe haven of perceived meritocracy. On the other 
hand, to deny meaningful access and opportunities to higher 
education would re-fortify segregation and expose meritocracy as a 
product of racial exclusion. We will never reach an equitable race 
neutral policy built on a politics of colorblindness because so much 
of how we live is based on race. 
For generations, racial discrimination in the United States has 
isolated minorities and subjected them to astronomical rates of 
unemployment, substandard housing, and inferior educational 
resources. Mfirmative action programs were never intended to 
victimize White Americans, but instead to give equal opportunity to 
Mrican Americans. The fact remains that no matter how many 
seats are slated, reserved, or set aside for minorities, the white 
majority continues to receive the lion's share. So what we are in 
fact quibbling over is roughly 5-10% of the enrollment at colleges 
and universities.43 Minorities still face the reality of being 
underrepresented in professions across the nation. In 2000, there 
were roughly 281,000,000 people living in this country.44 Mrican 
Americans represented 12% of the population and White Americans 
represented roughly 75% of the population.45 In that same year, 
roughly 72% of the bachelor's degrees, 66% of the master's degrees, 
and 59% of the doctorate degrees went to White Americans.46 
Mrican Americans only received 8% of bachelor's, 7% of the master's 
42 See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Emily Houh & Mary Campbell, Cracking the Egg: 
Which Come First-The Stigma or Affirmative Action, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1297, 1334 (2008). 
43 NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS (NCES), INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION 
SCIENCES, DESCRIPTIVE SUMMARY OF 2003-04 BEGINNING POSTSECONDARY STUDENTS: THREE 
YEARS LATER 33-34, 50 (July 2000), http://www.nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/2008174.pdf; see 
generally PETER SCHMIDT, COLOR AND MONEY: How RICH WHITE KIDS ARE WINNING THE WAR 
OVER COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 97-98 (2007) (discussing the generally low percentages 
of African Americans at top universities and measures taken to combat and offset that 
image). 
44 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002 8 tbl.1 (2004), 
http://www.census.gov/prodl2003pubs/02statab/pop.pdf. 
45 See id. at 29 tb1.24. 
46 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, POSTSECONDARY INSTITUTIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES: FALL 2000 AND DEGREES AND OTHER AWARDS CONFERRED: 1999-200019 
tb1.9 (2001), http:nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/2002156.pdf. 
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and 5% of the doctorate degrees in that same year.47 Proportionally, 
only in doctorate programs were White Americans significantly 
below representation. However, even with affirmative action in 
place, in each degree-bearing category, African Americans were 
underrepresented.48 Arguments about black competency 
notwithstanding, imagine the stark contrast these numbers would 
reveal in the absence of affirmative action initiatives. The goal of 
affirmative action programs is to allow a meaningful number of 
qualified minorities to participate in the American republic, and 
there is no other program that could substitute for affirmative 
action's impact on making otherwise inaccessible opportunities to 
minorities within their reach. 
Economist Barbara Bergmann provides an effective insight when 
she quotes a professor at Brown University who says, 
I have taught, advised and mentored a good many 
affirmative action admissions students and not one of them 
could by any stretch of the imagination have been called an 
"underachiever." . .. No, affirmative action doesn't allow 
anyone to get by on the color of hislher skin-we don't give 
affirmative action grades (except to athletes) no matter how 
the student got in.49 
It may be tempting to compare scholarships given to African 
American athletes to race-based affirmative action programs. But 
black athletes, who are concentrated in basketball, football and 
track and field, only make up a small percentage of those who enter 
universities under athletic affirmative action, compared to the 
majority of white sports of golf, swimming, hockey, field hockey, 
baseball, crew, soccer, rowing, lacrosse, volleyball, and gymnastics. 
The stigma of affirmative action rests on identifying it as a racially­
based quota and ignores the pervasive ways in which assistance is 
granted all along the racial and economic spectrum. This in turn 
reinforces inequality by normalizing assistance and aid given to 
white people while casting a cloud over aid given to minorities. 
Affirmative action was created in the interest of fairness. It 
brings equality and opportunity to uprooted African Americans. It 
47 See id. 
48 See id. According to this data, the percentage of degrees conferred to African Americans 
represented 25% less than their overall proportionate representation. See id. 
49 BARBARA R. BERGMANN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 119-20 (1996); see also 
Shelby Steele, Op·Ed, How to Grow Extremists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1994, at E17 (discussing 
how oppression can be celebrated and manipulated into a tool for gaining entitlements). 
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helps to remove established barriers and allows Mrican Americans 
to be considered equally in all positions. Race-based policies allow 
considerations for Mrican Americans in areas that were 
traditionally given to white males out of overt prejudice or the more 
subtle but equally damaging "good-old-boys" network. Even if we do 
take race out of policy decisions, we will still have subjective results, 
which continue to favor the white males who already have the 
majority of the seats and hence, perpetuate the reality of white 
racial preferences. And, the contentious issue of white racial 
preference is at stake in debates about affirmative action and racial 
diversity. 
II. WHITE SKIN PRIVILEGE 
I have had the opportunity to work with many talented students, 
both black and white. On one occasion, a group of students were 
conversing in my office about their recent LSAT scores. One white 
student commented that he was not pleased with his low score, but 
knew that he would at least get into the state's law school.5° When 
queried how he could be so sure, the student replied, "my uncle will 
donate a lot of money and I'll get in, no problem." This exchange 
was profoundly disturbing, both for the student's blatant 
announcement of privilege and for his apparent lack of 
embarrassment. It serves to expose the myth of meritocracy, 
deflates the contention that Mrican Americans play on a level field 
and highlights the true existence of "white skin privilege." Realities 
like this necessitate affirmative action programs. 
While the Bakke decision preserved the notion of race-based 
considerations in colleges and university admission policies, I want 
to reiterate legal scholar Derrick Bell's argument that it also 
afforded protection of "white skin privileges."51 Bakke's application 
of race-based categories, without recognition of the qualitatively 
different ways in which race impacts Mrican American versus white 
people, wholly disregards the reality that inequalities were not 
directed at everyone, but at a particular racial group. Hence, the 
category of race is not experienced equally across the board, which 
is the point of the term racism.52 Mfirmative action initiates 
50 In order to protect the identity of this student, the sex and name are withheld. 
51 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT 
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 302, 304 (Kimberle Crenshaw et. al. eds., 1995). 
52 See Ron Daniels, Racism: Looking Forward, Looking Back, in RACE AND RESISTANCE: 
AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE TWENTY·FIRST CENTURY 1,1-2 (Herb Boyd ed., 2002). 
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removal of the white man's privilege of exclusive access. The 
representation of race as a neutral experience and not a product of 
socio-economic inequality gives affirmative action programs the 
appearance of being racially oppressive to white people. While 
images of a post-civil rights level playing field are seductive, present 
day calls for racial diversity are not simply to "right" past wrongs, 
but also to counteract the persistence of "white skin privilege." 
Before we move on, let me give you a definition of what I mean by 
"white skin privilege." Legal scholar Sylvia Law speaks of "white 
skin privilege" as the "pervasive, structural, and generally invisible 
assumption that white people define a norm and [African Americans 
represent the] 'other,' dangerous and inferior."53 Legal scholar Ian 
Haney Lopez adds that "white skin privilege" is a social 
construction which creates a racial bureaucracy where whites exist 
at the top and African Americans are at the bottom.54 Finally, 
scholar George Lipsitz defines "whiteness" as manifested through 
"white skin privilege" as the creation of a superiority complex based 
on institutions "created by slavery and segregation, . . . by conquest 
and colonization."55 "White skin privilege," therefore, is manifested 
through the unequal distribution of housing, employment, education 
and state surveillance and violence (i.e., racial profiling, police 
brutality) along racial lines that benefit those labeled as "white."56 
Therefore, it is not ironic that many white people consider 
affirmative action programs to be racist. These programs threaten 
or at least challenge this racial distribution of advantages. 
Why do white people want to protect this privilege? Being white 
is valuable. White people, as legal scholar Cheryl Harris points out, 
have a unique interest in the commodification of their skin as 
property which relegates African Americans to the marginal, 
subordinate, and disadvantaged race. 57 Consider, for example, the 
53 Sylvia A. Law, White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603, 604 
(1999). 
54 IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 163 (1996). 
55 George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: Racialized Social Democracy 
and the "White" Problem in American Studies, 47 AMERICAN QUARTERLY 369,370 (1995); see 
generally Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, in RACE: AN 
ANTHOLOGY IN THE FIRST PERSON 120, 124-25 (Bart Schneider ed., 1997) (discussing the 
positive and negative advantages of present hierarchies). 
56 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127B S. Ct. 2738, 2788 (2007) 
(discussing social and racial hierarchies). 
57 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS 
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 276, 281 (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); see also 
Derrick Bell, The Real Costs of Racial Discrimination, in AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE 
LIVING CONSTITUTION 183, 188 (John Hope Franklin & Genna Rae McNeil eds., 1995) 
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illuminating experiment undertaken by political scientist Andrew 
Hacker, who asked white students to determine what would be 
adequate compensation if they had to "turn black" for the next fifty 
years.58 He commented that "most [white students] seemed to feel 
that it would not be out of place to ask for $50 million" as 
compensation for having to "turn black."59 This certainly reveals at 
least the tacit recognition that being white carries significant 
material benefits. We live in a society that has seen fit to socially 
construct categories of people by race since the nineteenth century. 
These social constructions, which in the twenty-first century, are 
expanded beyond a white and black binary, permeate all 
institutions of power. That being the case, we cannot ignore that 
the investment in "whiteness" fortifies, materializes, and 
naturalizes racial inequalities on the grounds of ahistorical notions 
of merit or neutrality. The once invisibility of "white skin privilege" 
is nOw revealing itself through affirmative action. Haney Lopez 
observes that: "White supremacy makes whiteness the normative 
model. Being the norm allows whites to ignore race, except when 
they perceive race (usually someone else's) is intruding on their 
lives."6o White people have a vested interest in "whiteness" because 
they want to believe that the color of their skin is worth more than 
other skin colors, that they are entitled to increased pay for the 
same work and desire that cultural and material capital remain in 
their hands. 
How does the language of Bakke reinforce "white skin privilege?" 
Bakke helps to maintain current political coalitions by advocating a 
neutral component to race or ethnic diversity classifications. Race 
neutrality in policy would, however, require a mythical state of 
socio-economic parity along racial lines, which has not existed. The 
fact that Bakke allows the doors to open for claims of reverse 
discrimination ignores the legacy of "whiteness" or "white skin 
privilege" as it pertains to the legal status, opportunities and 
equality of African Americans. The neutral language of Bakke adds 
to the benefits of "whiteness" in ways that race-based policies were 
not intended. The intended goal of affirmative action was to 
(describing how the creation of a sub-class of African Americans in the seventeenth century 
elevated poor whites). 
58 ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 31­
32 (1992). 
59 Id. 
60 LOPEZ, supra note 54, at 158. 
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delegitimize white privilege and deny legal protection exclusively to 
white people. Reverse discrimination claims ignore this history of 
racial inequality and continue to reward white people for their 
historical advantages in the labor market, and ensure economic 
returns to them in the long run. Bakke, moreover, has also opened 
the door for white people, who historically controlled the rewards, 
resources, and opportunities, to continue to control these areas. 
It can be argued that there were degrees of "whiteness" and some 
white people were oppressed because they were poor.61 However 
true this might be, as a whole group, white people were not 
oppressed in America because they were white people, while all 
groups defined as black, no matter the degree, were subjected to 
oppression without a legally sanctioned privilege of color. 
Furthermore, African Americans are also made to feel embarrassed 
because affirmative action is thought of as implicitly a "black thing," 
when such is not always the case. For example, a friend,62 who is 
also an academic, was in a departmental meeting about affirmative 
action. All faculty members agreed to instigate affirmative action 
searches, even though many were leery that such focused searches 
could be ''breaking the law." After the suggestion that affirmative 
action searches were breaking the law, it was then suggested by 
women and faculty of color that earlier searches in which they were 
directed to specifically fill a "Jesuit" and then later a "Catholic" 
position outside the competitive marketplace, were blatant 
examples of affirmative action, yet these parameters were 
considered legal. Many of the members, ambivalent about directed 
searches, quickly resisted associating these acceptable hires with 
the branding of affirmative action. The almost militant resistance 
to this nomenclature exposed the extent to which white people do 
not want to be associated with affirmative action. White people, 
however, do receive affirmative action, though not branded with the 
stigma, through well-established preference in jobs, education, and 
the "good-old-boys" network. 
61 For example, consider eugenic sterilization performed on poor white women in the early 
1920s. See, e.g., MA'ITHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 125 (1998) (discussing the eugenics program of 
Arthur Snobbcraft, which strongly favored Anglo-Saxons, and which was far from embracing 
"pan-white supremacism"); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS: How 
AMERICA'S IMMIGRANTS BECAME WHITE: THE STRANGE JOURNEY FROM ELLIS ISLAND TO THE 
SUBURBS 60 (2006) ("A debate on fertility rates and immigration restrictions conjured up 
threats of 'racial suicide' if this flow of migrants were not checked and/or the fertility of the 
native born did not increase."). 
62 In order to protect the identity of this faculty member, the sex and name are withheld. 
877 2009] Colorblind Diversity 
Although Bakke's concern for "white skin privilege" is not as 
blatant as cases such as Dred Scott v. Sanford,63 Civil Rights 
Cases,64 Martin v. Wilks,65 and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
CO.,66 it nonetheless reinforces a sense of white entitlement by 
denying the social and historical context of affirmative action 
policies directed specifically for "oppressed" and not "all" racial 
groups. There is a way in which the language of objectivity, 
neutrality, and meritocracy are associated with the historical 
experiences of the majority group. In this case, the so-called white 
interest is seen as being synonymous with neutrality. So the 
outlook of one group becomes universalized and everyone else is 
forced to evaluate themselves on those standards. Ironically, race­
based policies are posed as a threat to those "standards." Before the 
Bakke decision, race-consciousness was associated with being black 
and the race of white people was seen as invisible or at best seen as 
"irrelevant." Bakke not only made it politically viable for white 
people to organize around what had previously been an unattractive 
race-consciousness; it also gave them the basis to do so. Therefore, 
after the Bakke decision, we witness the proliferation of those who 
did not previously identify themselves on racial grounds, 
particularly white males, now arguing on those very grounds. In 
the post-civil rights era, "whiteness" has resurfaced as acceptable 
identity politics within the political mainstream. Decisions like 
63 See 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 393-95 (1856) (announcing that members of the "Negro" race 
were not citizens and were not intended to be included in the Rights and Privilege Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution), superseded by statute, U.S. CONST. amend. XN. 
64 See 109 U.S. 3, 23-25 (1883) (holding that Congress has no authority to create laws to 
give "Negroes" equal access to private accommodations and that private citizens (without 
state authority) can forbid "Negroes" from public accommodations unless the state 
intervenes). 
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act 
of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, 
or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or 
theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business. Innkeepers and public 
carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of 
their facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable persons who in 
good faith apply for them. If the laws themselves make any unjust discrimination, 
amenable to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has full power to 
afford a remedy under that amendment and in accordance with it. 
Id. at 24-25. 
65 See 490 U.S. 755, 767-69 (1989) (allowing white firefighters to sue the city, alleging 
reverse discrimination for hiring less qualified blacks, despite the fact that the city had been 
ordered to do so through consent decrees in actions in which the white firefighters were not 
parties). 
66 See 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989) (holding that setting aside 30% of contracts for blacks 
discriminates against whites). 
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Bakke helped legitimate "whiteness" as a viable political identity 
and white people as a part of an oppressed group. Because race 
continues to handicap Mrican Americans in a manner that it does 
not handicap whites, however, affirmative action is still necessary 
to diversify institutions of power that remain profoundly white 
despite the growing acceptance of reverse discrimination. 
III. BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY 
One of the key ways to engage the complex relationship between 
race and power is a cultural terrain on which this convergence is 
contested-the meaning of diversity. Diversity has been deployed 
as a powerful rationale for piercing through the blinding 
"whiteness" of institutional power. The post-Bakke cases have 
demonstrated how the term diversity has been used by those in 
power, which in effect decouples the notion of diversity from its 
historical link to racial inequality. We can only understand 
affirmative action as reverse discrimination if we ignore the 
pervasive racial terrain of power relationships in the state 
apparatus, education, and the workplace. The case of Bakke 
provides us with a legal legacy where diversity maintains its 
potency as a compelling state interest. But leaving the terms of 
diversity to the discretion of colleges and universities weakens the 
intent of the affirmative action mission. Contrary to some popular 
sentiment, affirmative action does not encourage the matriculation 
of unqualified students.67 But it does counter other subjective 
standards used by colleges and universities which favor white 
males. The persistence of racial discrimination determines the 
access of Mrican Americans to important institutions of power 
including educational and workplace arenas, among others.68 In my 
67 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
68 According to legal scholars W.H. Knight and Adrien Wing, "[d]ecisions often have been 
made to provide opportunities on the basis of some preferred set of characteristics [for white 
males]. Education, alma mater, family history, wealth, political affiliation-all have served 
as criteria for selecting one person or group over others." Knight & Wing, supra note 41, at 
211; see, e.g., MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-BLIND 
SOCIETY 226-27 (2003) ("[T]he color of one's skin still determines success or failure, poverty or 
affluence, illness or health, prison or college."); IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
166 (2005) (discussing the concept of ''black isolation" to point out that African Americans 
continue to suffer from race-based disadvantages); LESLIE MCCALL, COMPLEX INEQUALITY: 
GENDER, CLASS AND RACE IN THE NEW ECONOMY 38, 58 (2001) (discussing the interplay 
between race, gender, and class in measuring inequality, using an empirical analysis 
technique); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHfWHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
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estimation, the vagaries of access to these institutions of power 
produces two major results: first, it determines whether people of 
color will have meaningful access to cultural and material capital 
(i.e., education and labor market); second, at the same time, it 
rejects a diversity of opinion in determining the standards that 
determine access to this very capital. This allows those in power, 
who establish the norms, values, and behaviors through these 
institutions, to create rules of certification, status, and excellence 
based on their experiences, and hence, reproduce themselves. At 
best, those in the minority group have to learn the "rules" of the 
majority and adopt them as their own. It is because of this 
continual re-concentration of power, and marginalization of people 
of color from that very power that I will attempt to argue that race­
based policies are needed to achieve a diverse student body, not only 
in a higher education setting, but at all tiers of education. A diverse 
student body is not simply about creating a more multicultural 
workplace or educational experience. It is about adding a diversity 
of voices, opinions, and experiences in the creation of institutions of 
power and the rules that govern and produce them. 
Under the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny analysis, in order for 
racial distinctions to be considered constitutional, race-based 
policies must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.69 The Court has acknowledged that "[i]t is well established 
that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 174 (1995) ("Whether it be a matter of education, 
occupation, family, status, other characteristics positively correlated with income and wealth, 
blacks are likely to come out on the short end of the stick. This is no surprise."). 
69 See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (stating that affirmative 
action programs which give preference to race by government contractors are subject to strict 
scrutiny and must show a compelling interest for those preferences); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with 
particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect."); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail 
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.... [C]ourts must subject 
them to the most rigid scrutiny."); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) 
("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious 
to a free people .... [L]egislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has 
often been held to be a denial of equal protection."); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127B S. Ct. 2738, 2752 (2007) ("[T]he school districts must 
demonstrate that the use of individual racial classifications ... here under review is 'narrowly 
tailored' to achieve a 'compelling' government interest." (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227»; 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (noting that "[c]ontext matters" and "strict 
scrutiny must take 'relevant differences' into account"' (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228»; 
Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (''Racial and ethnic 
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial 
examination."). 
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basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed 
under strict scrutiny."7o In Grutter, the Court recognized that the 
desire to achieve a cross-cultural or diverse student body is 
compelling. 71 Fortunately, we do not live in a homogenous society, 
and therefore, our institutions of power must also reflect our diverse 
populations. Universities and colleges must foster racial and 
cultural interactions because the students in these institutions of 
power will eventually affect the lives, policies, and concerns of the 
rest of society.72 Increased exposure to other races and cultures can 
lead to better race relationships and improved cross-cultural 
understanding.73 Moreover, it will at least challenge standard 
operating procedures in the work place, provide equal opportunity 
to people of color, and encourage cultural awareness among all 
races. 74 
Unmoved by the diversity argument, Professor John McWhorter 
argues that race-based policies only serve to give preferential 
treatment to Mrican Americans, and ultimately, prevent Mrican 
Americans from "serious competition."75 But I argue just the 
opposite. Race-based considerations give Mrican Americans a foot 
in the door, so that they can fairly compete.76 Without this 
minimum preference, Mrican Americans were more often denied 
entrance to even "run the race." Race-based policies allow what 
white males have continued to receive covertly and even overtly, for 
a significant number of years. Additionally, other opponents of 
race-based programs could further argue that we should allow these 
70 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. at 2751; see also Johnson v. California, 543 
U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 
(2003). 
71 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (holding that diversity was a compelling state interest in higher 
education). It is also worth mentioning that the Court in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools, recognized that the state may also use racial classifications to remedy past effects of 
intentional discrimination. 127B S. Ct. at 2752; see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 
(1992) (noting that racial classifications may be used when the racial imbalance was caused 
by intentional discrimination). 
72 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-3l. 
73 Brief for Respondent at 19, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05­
908), 2006 WL 29229556. 
74 See NANCY MAcLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN 
WORKPLACE 309-11 (2006); PATRICIA GURIN ET AL., DEFENDING DIVERSITY: AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 110 (2004); BERGMANN, supra note 49, at 9-10. 
75 John McWhorter, '~ren't You in Favor of Diversity?" White Guilt and University 
Admissions, in AUTHENTICALLY BLACK: ESSAYS FOR THE BLACK SILENT MAJORITY 138, 146 
(2003). 
76 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas 
begins his opinion with a quote from Frederick Douglass, saying "[w]hat I ask for the negro is 
not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but simply justice." Id. 
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institutions of power to diversify their population without showing 
preference, by relying on their "good Will."77 When any institution is 
simply left to exercise "unfettered freedom" in selecting students, 
history has shown that the literal complexion of these institutions 
does not significantly change and consequently, the institutions of 
power and the rules that govern and reproduce them do not 
change.78 In fact, institutionalized racism in job discrimination, 
wage disparities, and segregated labor markets depends on the ethic 
of "unfettered freedom" reminiscent of the "states' rights" 
arguments made in the civil rights south. 79 
Some scholars and journalists argue that even with diverse 
student bodies, student populations remain extremely balkanized.80 
McWhorter further points out that the pursuit of diversity is a 
fallacy, because college campuses are "among the most racially 
balkanized settings in America."81 He charges that Mrican 
Americans on college campuses tend to stick together and 
discourage fraternization with the white race. 82 Similarly, in 
middle and high schools, some notice that the black kids sit 
together, isolated from their white peers, at the same table. 83 While 
it is true that in diverse settings some minority students have a 
vested interest in retaining Mrican American culture and do self­
select or discriminate, this should not suggest that we abandon the 
overall goal of enriching the educational experience through 
creating a diverse student body. Engagement with multicultural 
77 Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312, 314 (1978). 
78 See JAMILLAH MOORE, RACE AND COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 196 (2005) (stating that the use of "color-blind policies" by universities do not increase 
enrollment of Mrican American students and in some cases even result in a reduction in 
enrollment). 
79 See generally YASUHlRO KATAGIRI, THE MISSISSIPPI STATE SOVEREIGNTY COMMISSION: 
CML RIGHTS AND STATES' RIGHTS xxiv-xxv (2001) (noting proponents of states' rights in the 
south called for less federal government intervention in the states regarding matters of 
sovereignty); JOSEPH E. LOWNDES, FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW RIGHT: RACE AND THE 
SOUTHERN ORIGINS OF MODERN CONSERVATISM 30 (2008) (discussing the Dixiecrat Revolt and 
its focus on states' rights); MACLEAN, supra note 74, at 21-22 (stating employers argued 
against fair employment legislation believing they should have freedom to do as they wished 
with their own resources); JASON SOKOL, THERE GOES My EVERYTHING: WHITE SOUTHERNERS 
IN THE AGE OF CML RIGHTS, 1945-1975223-25 (2006) (stating that white southerners argued 
states' rights and white freedom in opposition of civil rights legislation); DAN R. WARREN, IF IT 
TAKES ALL SUMMER: MARTIN LUTHER KING, THE KKK, AND STATES' RIGHTS IN ST. AUGUSTINE, 
19641 (2008) (discussing the "Last Cause Myth" rationale for the Civil War). 
80 McWhorter, supra note 75, at 147. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 147-50. 
83 BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, "WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING TOGETHER IN THE 
CAFETERIA?" AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 52 (1997). 
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opinions in a freshman world history lecture is just as important as 
pledging an Mrican American sorority like, Delta Sigma Theta.84 
They can both be a part of the college experience, without negating 
each other. Moreover, established Mrican American institutions do 
more than just engage black issues. Through the lens of their 
organizations, they negotiate larger concerns, like academic 
excellence, community service, and adjustment to the university. 
Further, if we look at the goal of diversity as simply classroom 
"aesthetics,"85 things seem black and white. But this ignores the 
fact that many Mrican American institutions emerged as a response 
to white racial exclusion. While Mrican American children may sit 
at their own table or step in their own fraternity or sorority, by 
allowing them access to certain educational settings, they will be 
given the opportunity to read the same books, interact in the same 
networks, and receive the same certifications as their majority 
peers. Perhaps in the long run, if we do have affirmative action in 
primary and secondary educational settings, then a legitimate case 
could be made that at best we do not need affirmative action at the 
higher educational level, and at worst the Crutter time limit of 
twenty-five years could reasonably be realized.86 
Diversity pursued through race-based policies breaks down walls 
of white preference and institutions of extreme influence that have 
built a profound level of cultural and economic capital during 
periods of racial exclusion.87 Through affirmative action, groups 
who have previously been excluded on the grounds of race not only 
have the opportunity to compete based on the theory of leveling the 
playing field, but also have a policy that recognizes the extreme 
levels of institutional imbalance that have been accumulated over a 
84 An African American female sorority chartered on January 13, 1913. Delta Sigma Theta 
Sorority, Inc., 
http://www.deltasigmatheta.org/index2.asp (last visited on Feb. 5, 2009). 
85 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 354 n.3 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the interest in diversity to be merely "aesthetic" rather than truly educational). 
86 Justice O'Connor most famously announces a time limit on race-conscious policies. She 
declares, "[w]e expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be 
necessary to further the interest approved today." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 
(2003). 
87 See generally GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: How WHITE 
PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS vii, 6-9 (1998) (discussing the value of whiteness in 
a variety of contexts); DOUGLAS S. MAsSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 148-50 (1993) (describing the 
historically imbalanced institutions and how they perpetuated societal inequalities); CHARLES 
W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 10-12 (1999) (discussing how ''Racial Contract" theory 
seeks to explain the "subordinate civil standing" of non-whites in white dominated societies). 
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long period of time and seeks to take into account, through not just 
equality but through redistribution. 88 And in the interest of 
diversity, if it means that some groups are favored over others, 
"universities must be accorded the right to select those students 
who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas."'89 
While the Court cases seemed to opine that only institutions of 
higher education deserve "a special niche in our constitutional 
tradition,"90 I posit that we must not only acknowledge that the 
attainment of a diverse student body is a constitutionally 
permissible goal for an institution of higher education, but also 
accept this reason for modeling affirmative action policies in 
primary and secondary educational settings.91 
The Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1 (Parents Involved in Community Schools) and 
Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education cases presented 
the Court with its first challenge to race preference policies in 
primary and secondary school education.92 In a plurality decision 
authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court rejected the school 
board's efforts to achieve diversity.93 Justice Roberts suggested that 
race-based preferences were only constitutional if the school board 
could establish a compelling governmental interest that was 
narrowly tailored to meet that state's interest.94 Referencing the 
Court's prior cases that dealt with racial classifications, Justice 
Roberts stated that the only way the Seattle and Kentucky plans 
would survive strict scrutiny was if the programs either remedied 
past acts or effects of racial discrimination,95 or if the plans had as 
its goal to achieve diversity in the classroom setting.96 When race­
based preferences are used to remedy past acts of racial 
discrimination, it is only appropriate where there has been legally 
sanctioned discrimination based on race, and is impermissible when 
the goal is "to achieve racial balance."97 In fact, Justice Roberts 
states that "the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in 
88 LIPSITZ, supra note 87, at vii, 6-9. 

89 Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 (1978). 

90 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 127B S. Ct. 2738, 2754 (2007). 

91 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13. 





94 Id. at 2752. 

95 Id.; see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992). 

96 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. at 2753; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 

U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
97 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. at 2753. 
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the schools."98 Since the school district had chosen voluntarily to 
implement the race-based programs, by definition the plans were 
not instituted to remedy past racial discrimination. Therefore, 
according to Justice Roberts' analysis, the only constitutional 
justification for such plans would be to diversify the classroom.99 
However, because Bakke and then Crutter and Cratz were cases 
that involved institutions of higher education, Justice Roberts 
declined to apply this rationale to primary and secondary 
institutions. lOo 
This paper argues, like the Seattle and Kentucky school boards 
did, that there are real educational and far-reaching socialization 
benefits which can materialize if primary and secondary school 
children are exposed to racially diverse learning environments. IOI 
Moreover, if an affirmative action plan would reduce concentrated 
racial populations in certain schools and allow children of color 
equal access to the best schools available,lo2 then the means should 
justify the end. However, in rejecting these arguments put forth by 
the school boards, Justice Roberts makes it clear that even if these 
are valid reasons to use race-based preferences, Crutter was only 
talking about diversity in a specific and specialized context of 
"higher education."103 A diversity justification in any other context 
is inappropriate. Further, Justice Roberts opined that even if the 
Court were to apply the Bakke/Crutter diversity analysis to the 
Seattle and Kentucky plans, the school board's programs would still 
not pass constitutional muster.104 In Crutter, according to Justice 
Roberts, the Court advocated for a more "holistic" approachI05 to 
diversity and therefore any attempt to use diversity "to achieve 
racial balance ... would be 'patently unconstitutional."'lo6 While 
the Court correctly points out that the issue of diversity is not 
98 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. at 2752 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 
U.S. 267,280 n.14 (1977». 
99 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. at 2752-53. 
100 The Court found that Grutter applied only to institutions of higher education and 
distinguished institutions of higher education from other educational facilities, stating that 
"in light of 'the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university 
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.'" Id. at 2754 
(citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
101 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. at 2755. 
102 Id. 





105 Id. at 2753 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337). 

106 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. at 2753 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). 

885 2009] Colorblind Diversity 
simply about racial diversityl07 (even though racial diversity in the 
context of skin color is critically important), the Court misses the 
mark by narrowing the discussion of racial or ethnic diversity to 
simply discussions about racial quotas. Affirmative action 
programs such as these open up access to resources, offer exposures 
to different perspectives and opinions, and in the context of the 
United States, allow shared access to power-which is the hallmark 
of democracy. When one considers the impact that an affirmative 
action policy would have on primary and secondary institutions, we 
are talking about more than simply racial balancing. If children of 
color are given access to predominately white, (read, better) 
schools,108 we can envision smaller class sizes, better facilities and 
access to the power base of the parent association networks. 
I advocate in this paper that access to diversity is more than 
achieving racial balancing; Justice Roberts incorrectly assumes that 
racial diversity is the same as racial balancing. l09 Perhaps it was 
the way in which the Seattle and Kentucky school boards defined 
their plan,l1O but as I see it, racial diversity is about allowing a 
multicultural or pluralistic approach to a social phenomenon. In 
order to be racially diverse, a school does not have to reserve a 
selected number of slots simply for children of color. Instead, it 
requires that different cultural, racial and ethnic groups are pooled 
together and given equal access to all of the school's resources. 
Racial balancing, on the other hand, is akin to a racial quota. It 
solicits a certain number of slots or seats for children with a certain 
type of race. Racial balancing counts heads to assure that there are 
not too many or too few races represented. This is not what is at 
stake when there is a call for racial diversity. There may be 
occasions, however, that diversity in the classroom (particularly in 
primary and secondary learning institutions), may sometimes need 
a little bit of both. We need racial diversity in order to expose 
children to different sets of viewpoints, lifestyles, and rituals. But, 
we also sometimes may need racial balancing to relieve racial 
isolation and the lone spokesman syndrome.l11 Additionally, I do 
not agree with the Court when it states that "[a]llowing racial 
107 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. at 2753. 

108 In Parents Involved in Community Schools, the school district made this argument in 

reliance on their use of race for diversity purposes. Id. at 2755. 
109 See id. at 2758-59. 
110 See id. at 2747-50, 2759. 
11! Lone spokesman syndrome is the condition where, when topics of racial concern of 
discussed, the lone person is made to speak for the entire race. 
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balancing as a compelling end in itself would 'effectively assur[e] 
that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the 
"ultimate goal" of "eliminating entirely from governmental decision­
making such irrelevant factors as a human being's race" will never 
be achieved."'112 This incorrectly assumes that under a colorblind 
approach we can simply ignore that laws, policies and other 
decisions are influenced by race. And that by simply ignoring race, 
these laws, policies and other decisions will become race neutral 
over night. In fact, it is because the Court is unwilling to allow 
affirmative action policies to remedy past societal discriminatory 
acts113 or even to bear witness to the far-reaching effects of this 
history that "governmental decisionmaking" is influenced by 
"'irrelevant factors as a human being's race."'114 And, unfortunately, 
it is this reaSOn that we cannot wholeheartedly discount the true 
benefits offered by racial balancing. 
Until we can truly say we live in a colorblind society (and I 
suggest that this will take more than the twenty-five years 
suggested by Justice O'Connor),115 affirmative action policies are 
needed at all levels of higher education. It allows all to have 
meaningful voices in society, not just a select few. 116 It dismantles 
the token, who is made to speak for the entire race, or the 
juxtaposed Uncle Tom, who is made to feel that he must speak out 
against racial concerns for African Americans to disprove racial 
bias.l17 It is not only in the university settings where without any 
effort toward racial balancing we can identify the token or the Uncle 
112 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. at 2758 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989». 
113 Croson, 488 U.S. at 469, 498--99; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 
(1986); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. at 2758. 
114 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127B S. Ct. at 2758 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 495). 
115 Justice O'Connor most famously announces a time limit on race-conscious policies. She 
declares, "[w]e expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be 
necessary to further the interest approved today." Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 
(2003). 
116 See KATZNELSON, supra note 68, at xi, xiii, xv, 172 (advocating the extension of 
affirmative action to eliminate the need for it); Mary Frances Berry, Affirmative Action: Why 
We Need It, Why It Is Under Attack, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE 299, 303 (George 
Curry ed., 1996) (discussing the effectiveness of affirmative action in eliminating 
discrimination in higher education for women). 
117 See ELIZABETH ARIES, RACE AND CLASS MATTERS AT AN ELITE COLLEGE 2-3, 98--104 
(2008) (discussing the respective stereotypes common in different racial groups in higher 
education); JANE BOLGATZ, TALKING RACE IN THE CLASSROOM 18, 46-47, 53, 55, 86 (2005) 
(discussing the benefits racial dialogues in educational settings); DVD: THE DEREK BOK 
CENTER SERIES ON COLLEGE TRAINING: RACE IN THE CLASSROOM: THE MULTIPLICITY OF 
EXPERIENCE (Spectrum Media 2007) (on file with the Purdue University Library). 
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Tom, but racial diversity is also critical in primary and secondary 
classrooms when it is time to discuss the history of slavery or when 
the month of February ushers in Black History Month. While I 
agree that university campuses must mirror the populations they 
will serve, effective service requires access to the best forms of 
education at all levels. Affirmative action policies were supposed to 
be used until the larger social economic contexts were evenly 
distributed. Despite the Court's disdain, this may indeed call for 
quotas, racial balancing, critical masses or whatever the term of the 
day might be. 
A further legitimate and compelling reason to consider race for 
diversity purposes at all educational settings is that access to 
universities and colleges determine whether minorities will have 
access to equal cultural and material capital. A quick comment 
should be made about the difference between cultural and material 
capital. Material capital is obviously the accumulation of wealth. 118 
While cultural capital is influenced by income, social markers that 
include education, membership in certain elite organizations, and 
learning languages, methods, and techniques that shape the 
boundaries around inclusion and exclusion are equally important. 119 
Increasing the number of diverse groups and races into our 
institutions of power obviously decreases the disparity of income 
between the races or, at the bare minimum, increases the wages of 
these minorities.l20 Ideally, this would allow minority children to 
have the same access to preparatory aids and produce a more 
educated citizenry. With a more educated citizenry, the already 
false claim that minorities are less qualified will surely be 
debunked. Moreover, diverse decision makers would create new 
rules of access that extend beyond quantitative methods of testing 
that have long been exposed to measure little about intelligence and 
118 1 KARL MARx, CAPITAL: THE PROCESS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION 146 (Federick Engels 
ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling, trans., International Publishers 7th prtg. 1975) (1867); 
see also MEIZHU LUI ET AL., THE COLOR OF WEALTH: THE STORY BEHIND THE U.S. RAClAL 
WEALTH DIVIDE 1-2 (2006); OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 68, at 1-3; THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, 
THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: How WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 32­
33 (2004). 
119 Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241, 243-45, 248 (John G. Richardson ed., 1986). 
120 See Stuart Biegel, Court·Mandated Education Reform: The San Francisco Experience 
and the Shaping of Educational Policy After Seattle-Louisville and Ho v. SFUSD, 4 STAN. J. 
C.R. & C.L. 159, 160-61 (2008); see Minnesota State Bar Association, Law Schools in Focus, 
65 BENCH & B. MINN. 14, 14 (August 2008) (explaining that one legal institute's mission is to 
eliminate discrimination which creates barriers to opportunity for minorities). 
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more about one's historical access to a certain exclusive cultural 
world from which the tests pull their standards.l21 
Exposure to other races and cultures is crucial to a multiracial 
and multicultural America to avoid perpetuating an all-white ruling 
class and multiracial working poor. Diversity is not exclusively 
interested in exposure to the conditions of other groups, but 
exposure to other races and cultures as equals. Allowing primary 
and secondary educational institutions, along with universities and 
colleges, to consider race in admissions policies will compel our 
young people to engage in a diversity of ideas and people. This in 
turn will build the kind of educated and enlightened citizenry that 
we all claim to aspire towards in a democratic society. In addition, 
a more enlightened and educated citizenry should create relatively 
dynamic shifts in our social structure and at least begin to 
redistribute wealth and cultural capital accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
During the Reagan/Bush Administrations, significant limitations 
were placed on court-approved affirmative action plans, and the 
caseloads of white litigants who allege reverse discrimination began 
to climb.l22 This newfound fallacy represents the idea that a huge 
121 See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 232-33 (1996) (discussing the 
discovery of the shortcomings of standardized testing); NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST: 
THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MERITOCRACY 155-56 (1999); PETER SACKS, 
STANDARDIZED MINDS: THE HIGH PRICE OF AMERICA'S TESTING CULTURE AND WHAT WE CAN 
Do TO CHANGE IT 201-02, 218-20 (1999) (discussing how standardized testing favors certain 
thinking styles); Rebecca Zwick, Is the SAT a 'Wealth Test?" The Link Between Educational 
Achievement and Socioeconomic Status, in RETHINKING THE SAT: THE FuTURE OF 
STANDARDIZED TESTING IN UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 203, 213-14 (Rebecca Zwick ed., 2004). 
122 Based on an informal search of LexisNexis, between 1980-1992, there were at least 
two-hundred decisions alleging some form of reverse discrimination claims in the federal 
court system, compared to approximately eighty such decisions between 1964-1979. More 
than half of these decisions were from 1980-1988. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 
768-69 (1989) (permitting white firefighters to sue the city, alleging reverse discrimination by 
hiring less qualified blacks, despite the fact that the city had been ordered through consent 
decrees of which the white firefighters were not parties); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989) (holding that setting aside 30% of contracts for blacks 
discriminates against whites); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) 
(holding that it is reverse discrimination and a violation of equal protection to layoff white 
teachers when minority teachers with less seniority are not laid off under affirmative action 
program); see also Aaron Frieweld, The Mission: Stock Bench, in AM. LAw. May-June 1988, at 
6, 8 (special supplement) (stating that during the Reagan Administration, there were 76 
conservative appointees to the Court of Appeals, 74 of which were white, 1 black and 1 
Hispanic); but see Marcia Coyle, Kirk Victor & Fred Strasser, Administration Loses Major 
Round on Reverse Bias, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 1987, at 5 (discussing the Supreme Court's decision 
in Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), which allowed affirmative action plans 
2009] Colorblind Diversity 889 
proportion of society (white males) is being disadvantaged due to 
the preferential treatment of affirmative action programs. These 
reverse discrimination cases, however, stop short of showing an 
identified community that has been legally excluded from society 
based on their race. The ostensible advantage that affirmative 
action may give to Mrican Americans is meager considering the 
countless rewards continuously conferred on White Americans, 
based solely on race. Surely three-hundred years of slavery, 
followed by another hundred years of brutality, intimidation, 
discrimination, and surmounting years of civil rights struggles have 
not been remedied by the forty years of race-conscious affirmative 
action laws. And while it is true that affirmative action does not 
create equality, it helps to demolish de facto discrimination in 
employment, housing, and education, among other contexts. 
Because there is a way in which diversity can produce equality and 
meaningful opportunity for minority groups, we must locate our 
legal arguments within their true social and historical context. 
While the text of Bakke considered ethnic diversity as a factor in 
admissions, it should also take into account past social injustices. 
Unfortunately, the Bakke decision has just become language that 
opens the door to the white race as an oppressed group. When 
society allows white people to sue based on reverse discrimination, 
the language of Bakke is divorced from its intended historical and 
social context. This in turn also allows society to ignore that "white 
skin privilege" still exists. 
Therefore, attempts to restructure race-based programs through 
alternatives-such as class-based polices, equal learning 
opportunities for minority children, or lowering standards to enter 
higher education institutions-are limited. With respect to creating 
class-based policies, it ignores the conditions of racism within a 
class. If a program is to succeed, race and class must be understood 
as intersectional and not discrete. Second, concentrating on 
improving the educational opportunities of Mrican American 
children ignores the multi-tiered level of racism. The assumption 
under this alternative is that racism only occurs at an early stage. 
Networks of influence, access, and acculturation, however, span the 
spectrum of social experience from childcare to senior citizen homes. 
designed to eliminate "manifest [racial] imbalance[s],,); Ruth Simon & Kathleen Sylvester, 
Justice's Brief in Reverse Bias Case Rejects View of u.s. Rights Units, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 3, 1983, 
at 3 (describing how the Reagan Administration joined litigation on behalf of white litigants 
in a reverse discrimination case). 
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In addition, the intentions of Brown I have never been manifested; 
schools in African American urban communities are still 
underfunded and segregated. Finally, if we lower qualifications as 
one of the current Supreme Court Justices suggested,123 we ignore 
the purpose and goal of affirmative action initiatives. The debatable 
issues here are not about lowering standards, but about redefining 
what the standards should be. Part of the standards, with the 
social and historical context of four hundred years of racial 
discrimination, includes considering race as a legitimate factor for 
diversity at all tiers of education. 
123 Transcript of Oral argument at 31, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02­
241), 2003 WL1728613 ("[I]f Michigan really cares enough about that racial imbalance, why 
doesn't it do as many other State law schools do, lower the standards ....") Transcript of Oral 
argument at 37, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 1728816 ("[I]f 
this is indeed a significant compelling state interest, why don't you lower your standards?"). 
